

Message Text

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TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, KS, US

SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN AT
FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, MARCH 15, 1978

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF STATEMENT PRESENTED BY
AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN OPENING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MARCH 15:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN:

MY CONNECTIONS WITH KOREA DATE BACK TO THE PERIOD 1956-1960
WHEN I WAS REGIONAL PLANNING ADVISOR FOR EAST ASIA IN THE
BUREAU OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, AND IN THE COURSE OF WHICH
DUTIES I VISITED KOREA IN 1958 FOR THE FIRST TIME. FROM
THE BEGINNING OF 1960 TO THE END OF 1961, I SERVED AS
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DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION IN OUR EMBASSY IN SEOUL. THIS WAS
A STORMY PERIOD WHICH INVOLVED THE STUDENT UPRISING IN
APRIL 1960, THE DOWNFALL OF SYNGMAN RHEE LATER THAT MONTH,
THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS IN THE SUMMER OF 1960 WHICH
BROUGHT CHANG MYON TO POWER AS PRIME MINISTER, BUT HIS
OVERTHROW IN MAY THE FOLLOWING YEAR BY A MILITARY COUP

D'ETAT. IN 1963, WHEN I WAS CONSUL GENERAL IN HONG KONG, I WAS CALLED BACK TO WASHINGTON BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO REVIEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY NAMED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS. AFTER SERVING AS OUR AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA FROM 1965 TO 1969, I BECAME ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, A POSITION I HELD FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS. I WAS THEN ASSIGNED AS AMBASSADOR TO AUSTRALIA. I HAVE HAD NO CONNECTIONS WITH KOREA SINCE EARLY 1973. MY PRESENT POSITION IS COORDINATOR OF POPULATION AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

I RECOGNIZE FROM YOUR LETTER TO ME, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN MY VIEWS ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE PERIOD 1969-1972, INCLUDING THE FORMULATION OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE; THE CLIMATE OF ASIA DURING THAT PERIOD; HOW KOREA FITTED INTO U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EAST ASIA; KOREAN CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES; AND THE STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF KOREA. YOU ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KOREA'S REACTION TO THE MOVES TOWARDS IMPROVING U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

ON ALL THESE POINTS, I AM GLAD TO PRESENT MY VIEWS AS BEST I CAN RECOLLECT THEM. SPECIFIC EVENTS, ALONG WITH NAMES, DATES, AND ISSUES UNDER DEBATE ARE DIFFICULT FOR UNCLASSIFIED

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ME TO RECALL, AND IN THE TWO DAYS I HAVE HAD AVAILABLE FOR SEEKING TO REFRESH MY MEMORIES FROM FILES, I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO GO BACK OVER THE RECORD, EXCEPT IN A CURSORY AND SOMEWHAT HAPHAZARD FASHION.

WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON ASKED ME TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE IN MARCH 1969, I HAD ALREADY MET HIM ON TWO OCCASIONS--IN INDONESIA IN 1967, WHERE HE HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEADERS (AND WE HAD LENGTHY TALKS TOGETHER ABOUT ASIA AND CHINA) AND IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1969 WHEN, IN THE COURSE OF A TRIP TO EUROPE, HE VISITED PARIS TO DISCUSS VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS WITH HENRY CABOT LODGE AND OTHER LEADING MEMBERS OF OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM (TO WHICH I HAD BEEN ASSIGNED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS CONCURRENT WITH MY CONTINUING DUTIES AS AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA).

ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONVERSATIONS AND OTHER INFORMATION, I BECAME FAMILIAR WITH HIS VIEWPOINTS, MOST OF WHICH I SHARED. I ENJOYED HIS FULL CONFIDENCE AT THAT TIME.

BEFORE VISITING THE COUNTRIES OF MY NEW ASSIGNMENT IN MARCH 1969, I MET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SHOWED HIM A

PAPER WHICH I HAD DRAWN UP SETTING FORTH WHAT I CONSIDERED

TO BE HIS VIEWS, FOR I KNEW THAT IT WAS HIS VIEWS, NOT MINE, THAT THE LEADERS OF EAST ASIA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO KNOW. THE PRESIDENT REVIEWED AND APPROVED THE PAPER. I QUOTE JUST TWO KEY POINTS FROM THIS PAPER (WHICH I HAPPENED TO HAVE RETAINED IN MY FILES) BECAUSE THEY SUMMARIZE OUR BROAD POSITION AS IT RELATES TO OUR DISCUSSION HERE TODAY:

"THE UNITED STATES HAS VITAL INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AS WELL AS SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS. THE UNITED STATES WILL HONOR ITS DEFENSE COMMITMENTS, ALL OF WHICH WERE FORMALLY APPROVED BY THE U.S. SENATE.

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"WHILE U.S. INTERESTS REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AND THE COMMITMENTS IMMUTABLE, THERE IS UNDENIABLY A CHANGE IN MOOD OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THEY WILL BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT UNDERTAKING NEW COMMITMENTS. THEY ARE BECOMING SOMEWHAT IMPATIENT WITH CARRYING WHAT MANY CONSIDER TO BE A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE BURDEN OF MILITARY SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN AREAS WHICH, WHILE IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES, ARE NEVERTHELESS DISTANT. THEY ARE ASKING MORE AND MORE FREQUENTLY WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE DOING TO HELP THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER AND TO SHARE THESE BURDENS. THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE CAPACITY OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO COOPERATE FURTHER IN ASIA WILL THUS DEPEND TO AN IMPORTANT EXTENT UPON WHAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA ARE PREPARED TO DO FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR EACH OTHER. IT IS MOST IMPROBABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE AS MUCH AS IT HAS PROMISED TO DO FOR THE SUPPORT OF INDONESIA IN 1968 AND 1969 HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE FACT THAT JAPAN WAS WILLING TO PUT UP AN EQUAL AMOUNT AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO CONTRIBUTED."

I SUBSEQUENTLY MET WITH VIRTUALLY ALL THE LEADERS OF EAST ASIA AND FOUND THEM RESPONSIVE. THIS INCLUDED PRESIDENT PARK OF KOREA. MY LENGTHY REPORT ON THIS EAST ASIAN TRIP WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND, AT HIS REQUEST, WAS CIRCULATED TO KEY U.S. OFFICIALS.

THE ABOVE-QUOTED THEMES, AS WELL AS REFERENCES TO THE STRENGTH OF ASIAN COUNTRIES AND THE PRAGMATISM OF EAST ASIAN LEADERS WERE CONTAINED IN THE SCOPE PAPER I HELPED PREPARE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S ROUND-THE-WORLD TRIP IN JULY 1969, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE VISITED GUAM, MANILA, UNCLASSIFIED

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JAKARTA, BANGKOK, AND SAIGON. IT WAS AT GUAM, THE FIRST STOP OF HIS TRIP, THAT THE PRESIDENT, ON JULY 25, GAVE HIS CELEBRATED BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO THE LARGE PRESS CONTINGENT ACCOMPANYING HIM ON HIS TRAVELS. I AM SURE

THE PRESIDENT HAD NO THOUGHT OF ENUNCIATING THIS AS THE "NIXON DOCTRINE," BUT IT CAME IN TIME TO BE SO LABELLED. I RECALL THAT IT RECEIVED DECIDEDLY FAVORABLE REACTIONS FROM OUR PRESS AND FROM VARIOUS CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS.

THE "NIXON DOCTRINE" CONTAINED THREE BASIC PROPOSITIONS: (1) THE U.S. WILL KEEP ITS TREATY COMMITMENTS; (2) WE WILL PROVIDE A SHIELD IF A NUCLEAR POWER THREATENS THE FREEDOM OF CERTAIN NATIONS; AND (3) IN CASES OF OTHER TYPES OF AGGRESSION, WE WILL FURNISH AID AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WHEN REQUESTED AND APPROPRIATE; BUT WE SHALL LOOK TO THE NATIONS DIRECTLY THREATENED TO ASSUME THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DEFENSE.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY WAS PREMISED ON THE GROWING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST MOST OF THE COUNTRIES OF EAST ASIA, AS WELL AS ON THE DESIRE OF MOST AMERICANS (INCLUDING CONGRESS) THAT THE BURDENS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF FRIENDLY NATIONS BE SHOULDERED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE BY THEM, BUT WITH THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES AS REQUIRED AND JUSTIFIED. OVER SUBSEQUENT YEARS, WE CONTINUOUSLY ANNOUNCED THAT WE WOULD STAND BY OUR COMMITMENTS AND THAT WE WOULD RETAIN A STRONG U.S. NAVAL AND AIR PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. THIS WE DID.

I DO NOT RECALL KOREAN OPPOSITION TO THE NIXON DOCTRINE, AS SUCH, BUT THERE WAS CONTINUING CONCERN IN SEOUL IN 1969 AND 1970 OVER THE INTENTIONS OF NORTH KOREA AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTH KOREA. THIS WAS MADE CLEAR IN THE COURSE OF SECRETARY ROGERS' VISIT TO KOREA ON JULY 31 AND

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AUGUST 1, 1969, AND IN THE COURSE OF PRESIDENT PARK'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE HE MET PRESIDENT NIXON IN SAN FRANCISCO.

BETWEEN 1969 AND MAY 1972, OUR TROOP UNITS IN ASIA WERE REDUCED BY 540,000, MOST OF THAT AS PART OF THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM, BUT INCLUDING 20,000 FROM KOREA,

12,000 FROM JAPAN, 8,400 FROM THE PHILIPPINES, AND 16,000 FROM THAILAND.

THERE WAS, OF COURSE, A GREAT DEAL OF LEADERSHIP CONCERN IN SEOUL OVER OUR DECISION TO REDUCE U.S. FORCES IN KOREA FROM 63,000 TO 43,000, A DECISION CONVEYED PRIVATELY TO PRESIDENT PARK IN MARCH 1970. THIS CAUSED A LOT OF ANGUISH IN SEOUL, WHICH WAS NOT ENTIRELY ALLAYED BY OUR ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD SEEK ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ROK FORCE MODERNIZATION. THERE WERE OTHER ASSURANCES, MANY HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS, BUT WE COULD, OF COURSE, GIVE

NO GUARANTEE THAT REQUIRED MODERNIZATION FUNDS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. AFTER THE INITIAL SHOCK WAS WEATHERED, ROK-U.S. MILITARY TALKS TOOK PLACE REGARDING THE SPECIFICS OF FORCE WITHDRAWALS AND COMPENSATORY MEASURES INCLUDING ROK FORCE MODERNIZATION.

MY RECOLLECTION OF THESE EVENTS IS CLOUDED BECAUSE I WAS DEEPLY INVOLVED AT THAT TIME IN EVENTS RELATING TO SOUTH-EAST ASIA. MOREOVER, AMBASSADOR BROWN, MY PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, HAD JUST BEEN OUR AMBASSADOR TO KOREA. KOREAN AFFAIRS WERE LARGELY IN HIS COMPETENT HANDS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO RECALL THE MEETINGS WE HAD WITH ALL OUR AMBASSADORS TO EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES IN JULY 1970.
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THE OFFICIAL SECRET REPORT OF THAT CONFERENCE CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING PASSAGES:

"FORCE REDUCTIONS ARE INEVITABLE, AND IN MANY CASES, INCLUDING KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES, DESIRABLE ...

"NOTE WAS TAKEN OF HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT THE NIXON DOCTRINE HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN USEFUL ASIAN INITIATIVES, AND THAT THE DOCTRINE IN ITS PRESENT FORM WILL SERVE AS A VALUABLE STIMULUS FOR FURTHER ASIAN MOVES. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPANTS AGREE THAT THIS DESIRABLE TREND WILL DISAPPEAR IF THE U.S. CANNOT CONTINUE TO GIVE REASSURANCE TO OUR ASIAN FRIENDS IN TERMS OF DEFINED U.S. GOALS AND U.S. RESOURCES THAT WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE. REPEATED MENTION WAS MADE OF DECLINING AID AND MAP RESOURCES, WHICH, IF NOT INCREASED, COULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ASIANS TO DO WHAT THEY NEED AND WANT TO DO FOR THEMSELVES."

ABOUT A YEAR LATER, WE HAD ANOTHER MEETING WITH ALL OUR AMBASSADORS IN THE FAR EAST AND WITH WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVES. THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THAT 1971 MEETING CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE:

"ALTHOUGH THIS (U.S.) WITHDRAWAL WAS AT FIRST VIEWED WITH APPREHENSION BY SOUTH KOREA, THE KOREANS ARE TODAY PROUD OF THIS ACHIEVEMENT WHICH COMPORTS WITH THEIR SENSE OF NATIONALISM AND PRIDE OF ACHIEVEMENT. ROK FORCES NOW MAN THE ENTIRE 150 MILES OF THE DMZ, WITH U.S. FORCES PULLED BACK FROM THE FRONT LINE."

HOWEVER, OUR AMBASSADORS, THEN AND ON FREQUENT OTHER OCCASIONS, EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER OUR CAPABILITY TO MEET OUR OBLIGATIONS AND OVER CONGRESSIONAL CUTS IN OUR MAP AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUESTS.

ASIDE FROM THE NIXON DOCTRINE, THE TWO OTHER PRINCIPAL UNCLASSIFIED

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DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PERIOD 1969-1972 RELATED TO EVER-IMPROVING U.S.-JAPANESE COOPERATION (AS WELL AS ROK-JAPANESE RELATIONS) AND TO BROADENING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SO AS TO LESSEN DANGERS AND TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA.

IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH JAPAN REQUIRED DECREASING THE HIGH VISIBILITY OF OUR DEFENSE FORCES IN JAPAN AND REACHING A SETTLEMENT WITH REGARD TO OKINAWA. THESE STEPS WERE TAKEN IN THE COURSE OF THE FOLLOWING YEAR AND WERE DONE, AS BEST I RECOLLECT, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WHICH, MEANWHILE, HAD BEEN COMING TO HAVE EVER BETTER RELATIONSHIPS, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS, WITH JAPAN. JAPAN'S ECONOMIC PROSPERITY CLEARLY MEANT PROSPERITY FOR KOREA.

KOREA HAD, MEANWHILE, BEEN ENJOYING ONE OF THE MOST RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES IN THE WORLD, RUNNING AT 10 PERCENT OR BETTER YEAR AFTER YEAR. ALL THIS MADE IT MORE POSSIBLE FOR KOREA TO PROVIDE THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATELY STRONG DEFENSE, AND IT ALSO GAVE KOREA MOUNTING CONFIDENCE IN ITS CONFRONTATION WITH NORTH KOREA WHOSE PACE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH NOWHERE NEAR MATCHED THAT OF SOUTH KOREA.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WELCOMED THE STRONG STAND WHICH WE HAD BEEN TAKING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WAS A STALWART ALLY IN VIETNAM, CONTRIBUTING ABOUT TWO DIVISIONS TO THAT CONFLICT. WE WERE WELL AWARE OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CONTRIBUTION. IT MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE SUPPORT KOREA'S DEFENSE AND THAT WE CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE LEADERS IN SEOUL WITH REGARD TO OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS. UNCLASSIFIED

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MY LAST TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT PARK, AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, TOOK PLACE IN MARCH 1972, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA; AND IN JULY 1972 WHILE VISITING SEVERAL EAST ASIAN CAPITALS. ON BOTH THOSE OCCASIONS, I FOUND PRESIDENT PARK QUIETLY CONFIDENT. HE SEEMED TO WELCOME PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHINA INITIATIVE, WHICH WAS THE REACTION OF ALMOST ALL THE OTHER LEADERS OF ASIA I MET IN THE COURSE OF THAT 14-NATION, POST-CHINA TRIP. ASIDE FROM ITS INTRINSIC MERITS, THIS MOVE WAS SEEN AS HAVING STRONG SUPPORT FROM BOTH CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION. SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH SOLIDARITY ARE WELCOMED BY NATIONS WHOSE VERY SURVIVAL CAN DEPEND ON U.S. STRENGTH AND RESOLVE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, AS I REPORTED TO THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MY RETURN FROM VISITING THE CAPITALS OF EAST ASIA, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF CONCERN OVER U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR EAST ASIA. HERE I WILL QUOTE FROM MY TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE ON MARCH 23, 1972:

"I DETECTED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN, NOT ABOUT OUR GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE, BUT RATHER ABOUT ITS ABILITY TO DO SO IN THE FACE OF WHAT APPEARS TO THEM A GROWING ANTI-AID ATTITUDE IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS INDEED MUCH CONCERN, LEST OUR PROGRAMS OF SUPPORT FOR ASIAN NATIONS DECLINE TOO RAPIDLY. THEY ARE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE EXACTLY WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY THAT WE STAND BY OUR COMMITMENTS AND THAT WE INTEND TO REMAIN A PACIFIC POWER."

PRESIDENT PARK WAS IN A POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND WITH REGARD TO OPENING A DIALOGUE WITH NORTH KOREA WHEN I MET HIM IN THE SUMMER OF 1972. OBVIOUSLY, HE WANTED TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH BUT NOT THE KIND OF STRENGTH THAT WOULD

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THREATEN THE NORTH BUT WOULD RATHER ACCELERATE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS ALSO THEN, AS ALWAYS, MINDFUL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IN, AND WITH REGARD TO, THE UNITED NATIONS.

PERHAPS ONE REASON FOR HIS CONFIDENCE WAS THE DECREASE IN DANGEROUS INCIDENTS OF PROVOCATION BY NORTH KOREA. WE

ALL RECALL THE SUCCESSION OF POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE INCIDENTS BACK IN 1968 AND EARLY 1969: THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO, THE EC-121 INCIDENT, AND THE BLUE HOUSE RAID. BUT, INFILTRATION INCIDENTS FELL OFF SHARPLY FROM 761 IN 1968 TO 106 IN 1970 TO NONE IN THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1972. THIS DID NOT, AND DOES NOT, MEAN THE THREAT IS OVER; AND NORTH KOREA IN 1973 STIFLED THE NORTH-SOUTH TALKS WHICH HAD BEEN MAKING SOME PROGRESS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, YOU ASKED MY VIEWS AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF KOREA. KOREA HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY GEORGE KENNAN AS ONE OF THE TWO MOST CRITICAL SPOTS IN THE WORLD, THE OTHER BEING THE MIDDLE EAST. I AGREE WITH THAT VIEW. KOREA IS THE ONE PLACE ON THE SURFACE OF THIS GLOBE WHERE THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, THE U.S., AND JAPAN DIRECTLY INTERFACE. MOREOVER, KOREA IS A DIVIDED NATION, AND DIVIDED NATIONS BY THEIR VERY NATURE PRESENT DANGERS AND TENSIONS ALL OF THEIR OWN. WHAT HAPPENS IN KOREA WILL IMPACT DIRECTLY ON THE FATE OF SOME 50 MILLION PEOPLE. IT WILL ALSO HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF THE STABILITY AND PEACE OF THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY. THAT WE HAVE FOUGHT SIDE-BY-SIDE

WITH ROK FORCES ADDS AN EVEN FURTHER DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM, FOR WE HAVE ALL THE GREATER STAKE IN ENSURING THAT THESE SACRIFICES ARE NOT IN VAIN.
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PARTICULARLY IN THE LATTER REGARD, WE HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ESPECIALLY THE WELL-BEING OF KOREAN PEOPLE: THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT, THEIR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT, THEIR BASIC RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. ON THE LATTER SCORE, WE HAVE HAD (AND STILL HAVE) SOME DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE OUR VIEWS KNOWN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS MADE GREAT STRIDES ECONOMICALLY WHICH HAVE IMPROVED CONDITIONS OF LIFE FOR MOST PEOPLE. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS ALSO SCORED IMPORTANT SOCIAL PROGRESS, INCLUDING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND IMPROVED STATUS OF WOMEN, AND INTELLIGENT FAMILY PLANNING.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THESE ARE PERSONAL VIEWS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUEST. ALL JUDGMENTS ARE SUBJECTIVE, BUT I HAVE SOUGHT TO BE AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. END TEXT

2. REPORT OF HEARINGS BEING SENT SEPTTEL. VANCE

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